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THE RIGHT AND POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN
THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
ITS EXERCISE WHOLLY INDEPENDENT OF ALL ASSISTANCE,
AGENCY OR CONSENT OF THE STATES. CORRECTIONS OR EXPLA-
NATIONS OF SOME IMPORTANT MISCONCEPTIONS WHICH HAVE
HITHERTO PREVAILED VERY EXTENSIVELY UPON THE SUBJECT.
AT WHAT TIME COMPENSATION MUST BE MADE.
THE main question, which we here propose to discuss seems to
us to be one of more vital importance, and attended with more
consequences essential, we might almost say fundamental, to the
very existence of independent, self-acting, national sovereignty,
than the mass of the people, or of the profession even, have gene-
rally regarded it.
We suppose it is now pretty generally conceded, that our na-
tional government is a complete sovereignty, and that it was in-
tended to have it possess all the powers of national sovereignty,
independent of, and paramount to, all state sovereignty. We ap-
prehend, too, that no one will now question, that the state and
national sovereignties embrace the same territorial limits, each
possessing sovereign power over such territory, for the exercise of its
own peculiar functions, and that each is, nevertheless, as com-
pletely distinct from, and independent of, the other, as any two
foreign states or governments. This is very fully stated by Chief
Justice TANEY, in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. U. S. 506, and is
the pervading doctrine of all the decisions of that Court, wherever
the question has arisen.
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It will, therefore, be very apparent to all, that if the nation is
really left dependent upon state legislatures for the ordinary exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain, it will form a very surprising
exception to the general theory of the national government. The
fatal defect in the old confederation was precisely this, that it pos-
sessed no automatic functions, but was entirely dependent upon
the action of the states. It was the leading, and almost exclusive
purpose, of the framers of our national Constitution, to cure this
very defect. It must then be very apparent to all, that if this
important and indispensable power of sovereignty was still left
under the exclusive control of the states, it will form a very maiked
and unaccountable exception to the general scope and purpose of
the national 4 onstitution. There is certainly nothing else in that
instrument at all analogous to it. These considerations would
surely justify any one in requiring very satisfactory evidence, that
such is the necessary or natural construction of those provisions of
the national Constitution, before he could fairly come to any such
conclusion.
Our examination of that instrument leads to the conclusion, that
there is not only no provision of that kind to be found in it, but
that the contrary is expressly declared, in two of its provisions, in
terms not susceptible of any other fair interpretation. In art. i.,
section 8, defining the powers of Congress, it is provided, that
Congress shall "exercise exclusive legislation" over the territory
ceded by the states for the "seat of the government of the United
States, and over all places purchased by the consent of the
legislature of the state * * * for the erection of forts, maga-
zines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings." This last
clause, upon the well-known rule of construction, that a general
clause following a specific enumeration, must be restricted to things
ejusdem "generi8 with the specific enumeration, can only mean,
"other buildings needful" for the purposes of forts, magazines, &c.
The first inquiry will then be, by what sovereignty is the site of
those erections to be "purchased " ? It must be by the national
sovereignty, since to understand that word as having reference to
the states would make nonsense of the provision. And it has been
well said by the Supreme Court of the United States, in numerous
cases, that the national Constitution was adopted with such careful
deliberation, that we may fairly regard every word as having some
definite and distinct meaning. We cannot, then, understand "pur-
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chased by the consent of the legislature of the state" as meaning
purchased by the states, by the consent of the states, for this would
be a looseness of exp-ession for which there is no parallel in any
other portion of that instrument. It must import a purchase by the
national government with the consent of the states. The diffier-
ence of language, too, between this provision and that in regard to
the seat of the national government, shows very clearly that the
intent was not a mere cession of the exclusive territorial jurisdic-
tion. There is here to be a purctase, by the national sovereignty,
of the proprietary right to the sites of "forts," &c. But what is
here implied by the word "purchased"? It must naturally have
the same import as in the ordinary case of purchasing land, by the
sovereignty, for public purposes. It must of course embrace all
the modes of such purchase, i. e., by the consent or voluntary
relinquishment of the owner, and also by proceedings in invitum,
for the condemnation of such land to such use, whenever that
becomes necessary. For we cannot suppose that it was intended
to leave the paramount national sovereignty at the mercy, or
caprice, of every land-owner, as to whether it would be able to
obtain the most eligible sites for its forts, and other military and
naval statidns. There are some public structures, where the par-
ticular site is more essential than that of other public erections.
But some may inquire why the consent of the state legislatures
was required in this case? Evidently because the erections, thus
provided for, of necessity would exclude the state jurisdiction. It
would be inconsistent with the discipline of a fort or naval station
to admit any joint jurisdiction of the states. From the very nature
of the case the national authority must be exclusive of all other.
But we cannot for a moment suppose that so carefully framed an
instrument as the national Constitution could have used the term
"consent" to a purchase by the nation, for its own use, as embrac-
ing also a purchase by the state, for the use of the nation. The
things are radically distinct and different.
There are many other considerations, tending to show that this
must have been the intent of this provision. The exercise of the
power of eminent domain can only be effected in any case, state or
national, by the action of the legislative department of the gov-
ernment. Neither the executive or judicial departments can act
in such cases, except in conformity to legislative provisions, either
general or special. The legislature must determine both the use
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and the necessity, before any government can take private pro-
perty. But how can the state legislatures judge of the public uses
or necessities of the national government? We know it has been
sometimes argued in these cases, both by counsel and courts, that
the state providing for taking private property, for the use of rail-
way and turnpike corporations, is analogous to its legislating for
the condemnation of property, for the uses of the nation: Gilmer
v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229. But these corporations are the mere
instruments and dependencies of the states creating them. The
uses and the necessities are those of the state, and it may as well
adopt the agency of its own corporations, in carrying forward such
enterprises, as to commit them to the agency of natural persons,
its officers or appointees. It must of necessity act through some
agency or organs, since it has no other mode of action. In Bed-
dall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444, the court argue, that the provision in
the state Constitution, for taking property for public use, embraces
the uses of the national government, since those uses are public.
But public in this sense means pertaining to the same government.
And no government can condemn private property for any use,
which does not grow out of the duties and consequent necessities
of the same government. The lexicographers define "public use"
as "belonging to a state or nation :" Johnson; or, as Webster ex-
presses it, "pertaining to a state, nation or community." It is
upon this ground that the courts have held that the state legisla-
tures cannot delegate to the municipalities, the power to foster the
building up of their general commercial prosperity by means of
taxation. Commercial prosperity may be, in a wide sense, of
public concern, and a public benefit. But it is not a "public use,"
in the sense of the state Constitutions, for which private property
may be condemned, either by way of taxation or of eminent do-
main: Allen v. Jay, 12 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 481; 60 Me. 124;
Brewer v. Brewer, 13 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 785; 62 Me. 62 ; Weeks
v. Milwaukee, 10 Wisc. 242; -Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454.
It would seem not to require much argument to show that the
public or governmental uses of the states are not identical with
those of the nation. The governments, and, by consequence, their
public uses, are as completely separate and distinct from each other
as those of any two states or countries, entirely foreign to each
other, can possibly be. And the owners of private property may
justly demand, that the sovereignty requiring the condemnation of
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such property to its public uses, shall first, by its legislative depart-
ment, determine the necessity of such condemnation, for those
purposes. The fact that Congress has never made any general or
special legislation, to this end, will afford no presumption against
the existence of the power of eminent domain in the national
government. That power is an indispensable function of all auto-
cratic governments or sovereignties. It has no connection with
the source of the title to property, and is in no sense a reservation
in the grant of lands or other property, for, if so, most of the
new states would not possess it, since the title of the lands in those
states was not derived from the states but from the United States.
Nor is the fact that the states may take land from the United
States, within their limits, for public uses, as was held in United
States v. Railway Bridge Co., 6 McLean 517, and some other
cases, any argument in favor of the states possessing the power
of eminent domain, above that of the nation, as was argued by
the court in Gilmer v. Lime Point, supra. In such cases the
United States stand merely as proprietors, and possess no preroga-
tives of sovereignty in their title. If the states owned all the lands
within their limits, that would not preclude the national govern-
ment from taking so much of it as is required for its public uses.
This power of taking the property of the other for public uses
exists both in the states and the nation.
But in regard to all the public uses of the nation (except for
forts and other naval and military uses), such as custom-houses,
court-houses, post-offices, &c., and for railways and canals, where
there is no necessity and no right to exclude state jurisdiction,
there is no provision for obtaining even the consent of the states.
It rests upon the general right of eminent domain, inherent in all
complete and independent sovereignties. And, in the 5th article
of amendment to the United States Constitution, we find the same
provisions upon which the right of eminent domain rests, in all
the states where there is any specific provision upon the subject,
viz.: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation." This must refer to the national government,
since it has been often decided that all the provisions of the United
States Constitution do refer to the national government, unless the
states are specially named : Barren v.Baltimore, 7 Pet. 248 ; Fox
v. Odo, 5 How. 410. This has been decided in New Hampshire
by the highest state court: Concord By. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47 ;
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_3it. Washington Bty., 35 Id. 134. How then can the same court
possibly explain this limitation upon the exercise of the right of
eminent domain, in the national Constitution, without conceding
its existence in the national sovereignty, as it seems impliedly not
to do in Orr v. Quimby, 54 X. H. 590, where the court held the state
may condemn the land for the use of the nation. The idea of
fixing a limitation upon the exercise of a power, which did not
exist, no one will contend for. The court, in the case of Orr v.
Quimby, supra, attempts to escape this conclusion, by saying the
power of taking private property for the public uses of the nation
may exist in the states, notwithstanding its existence in the national
government. But this seems to us entirely inadmissible. If the
nation possesses the power there is no necessity, and no propriety of
resorting to the states for its exercise on their behalf. There is
nothing analogous to such double powers for the same purpose, in
any other respect. The power of the states to punish offences
against the coinage or the securitics of the nation, only exists so
far as such offences affect the interests of the state. The. states
have no power to punish offences exclusively against the United
States. Thi$ is too obvious and too well settled to justify the cita-
tion of authority. And it need not be argued how completely at
the mercy of the states the idea of fixing the power of eminent
domain, for national purposes, exclusively in the states, must leave
the national government. -It could not build a canal or improve
the navigation of a river, or construct a railway, except by the
action of the states. There was nothing, in our judgment, in the
mad theory of the national sovereignty, -which ripened into the re-
bellion and civil war, more flagrantly absurd than this. We have
noticed the argument of the state courts, in favor of this view, in
all the cases which we know of, except that of Burt v. The Hrer-.
chants' Ins: Co., 106 Mass. 856. In this case no argument is at-
tempted. It is placed solely upon the long usage. And the
Southern States might have justified most of their theories in the
same way. The truth unquestionably is, that the national govern.
ment has been compelled, to allow many of its important national
functions, hitherto, to lie in a state of suspended animation, and
beg its way along, at the mercy of the states, in many very essen-
tial particulars, when its powers were most unquestionable. So
that, mere silence on the part of the nation does not imply acqui-
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escenec. It was merely waiving, for the present, the exercise of its
just powers, in order to quiet public opinion.
We might say much more, but we fear we may already have
said more than will be read. We are happy in being able to refer
to one decision by an able court, supported by a very able and
satisfactory opinion, where the same conclusion was reached, with
that above stated, but in a somewhat different course of reasoning,
but one every way eminently satisfactory to us. We refer to the
opinion of Mr. Justice COOLEY in Trombley v. H1umihrey, 23
Mich. 471. We should certainly not have attempted any argu-
ment upon the question had we not regarded it as being important,
and as we have before said fundamental in constitutional construc-
tion, and one which has not hitherto received that consideration,
either from the profession or the courts, which it is fairly entitled
to demand.
II. There is one other question connected with this subject,
which is one of even more importance, so far as principle is con-
cerned, than the one we have so extensively discussed: i. e., at
what time the owner of the property taken is entitled to receive
the price of it. But it is most thoroughly and learnedly discussed
in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Doi, in Orr v. "Quiriny,
supra, and we could add nothing valuable to what will there be
found. It seems to us, that upon principle, the dissenting opinion,
that the price must be paid concurrently with the taking, is well
founded, and the tendency of judicial opinions in this country, is
unquestionably in that direction. It has always seemed to us, that
the provision in the American constitutions, requiring compensa-
tion to the owners of private propertytaken for public use, was
entitled to receive the natural and ordinary construction. And in
ordinary cases, where there is no provision for credit, the seller is
entitled to the price, concurrently with the delivery, and is not
bound to make delivery until he receives the price, or some security
which lie is willing to accept in lieu of tle price. This may not
be practicable, in cases where the damage cannot be known till
after the same is defined by the actual extent of the use. But in
such cases the purchaser may be required to make an adequate de-
posit. And we see no reason why cases, where property is pur-
chased by the state or a municipal corporation, or by the nation,
should be any exception to the rule above stated. The security for
ultimate ability to make payment may be more ample in such cases
